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I. Introduction
Dr. Grace Pierce began to work for Ortho Pharmaceutical Corpo-
ration in May, 1971 as Associate Director of Medical Research. By
March of 1973, she was Director of Medical Research/Therapeutics,
responsible for overseeing development of therapeutic drugs. In early
1975, Dr. Pierce was on a team researching loperamide, a drug for the
treatment of diarrhea in infants and older people. Lopermide was to be
taken in liquid form, since the very young and the very old might have
trouble swallowing pills. The drug was to be sweetened with saccharin.
Each bottle would contain forty-four times the concentration of
saccharin that the Food and Drug Administration permitted in a
twelve-ounce can of artificially-sweetened soft drink.
Dr. Pierce and her project team, aware of the controversy sur-
rounding saccharin as a possible carcinogen, began to submit memos to
Ortho's management, urging an alternative formula before tests would
be conducted on humans. The project team's toxicologist, for instance,
noted that saccharin was a "slow carcinogen;" that is, it produced be-
nign and malignant tumors in laboratory test animals after seventeen
years. The harm it might cause would be obvious only after a long
period of time, and "any intentional exposure of any segment of the
human population to a potential carcinogen is not to the best interest of
public health or the Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation."1 It seemed,
however, that the invitations had already been sent; that is, Ortho had
no intention of moving the deadline for putting loperamide on the mar-
ket. Pressure from company management made Dr. Pierce's colleagues
change their minds, and by April of 1975, the team voted to go ahead
with clinical testing.
* Assistant Professor, Legal and Real Estate studies, Temple Univ. School of
Business; J.D., Rutgers Univ. School of Law Camden, 1981; N.A., Jordenhill College,
Glasgow, Scotland, 1974; B.A. Colby College, 1970.
1. H. KURTz, WHISTLEBLOWING: LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION
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Dr. Pierce held out for reformulation. As the only medical doctor
on the team, responsible for setting up and monitoring tests on human
beings, she felt it was her professional, ethical duty to resist, and she so
informed her supervisor. In her deposition she said, "I wanted to be on
that project but I didn't want to take that high saccharin formula out
to the clinical practice ... I could not ethically take that out and give
it to children." 2 As a result of her stand, Dr. Pierce was first demoted
(or "re-assigned" as Ortho put it) and removed from all therapeutic
drug projects. Later, she was told that Ortho's management considered
her unpromotable. In June of 1975, Dr. Pierce submitted her resigna-
tion.3 Dr. Pierce brought a lawsuit against her former employer for
wrongful discharge. Ortho filed for summary judgment, pointing out
that Dr. Pierce signed no contract, only a secrecy agreement, and her
job had no fixed term. As an employee at will, Ortho argued, she could
be fired for "good cause, or bad cause, or no cause at all."'
In January of 1978, a New Jersey Superior Court granted Ortho's
motion, but the Appellate Division reversed, noting "that a growing
minority of jurisdictions permit recovery where the employment termi-
nation contravenes a clear mandate of public policy."5 Without imme-
diately jumping on the bandwagon, the court sent the case back down
for development of the facts at trial, adding that the public policy ex-
ception might be "particularly pertinent to professional employees
whose activities might involve violations of ethical or like-standards
having a substantial impact on matters of public interest, including
health and safety."'
The New Jersey Supreme Court, while recognizing a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful discharge when a clear public policy has been vio-
lated, found that Ortho's motion for summary judgment should have
been granted.7 Public policy sources could include statutes, regulations
and case law, and, the court added, a professional code of ethics. The
court also mentioned a professional employee's "special duty" to ad-
here to such a code, even when it obliges them to decline to perform
acts required by their employers. The Court drew a line, however:
2. Id. at 113.
3. Id. at 113-14.
4. NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1956).
5. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 166 N.J. Super. 336, 339 A.2d 1023
(1979).
6. Id.
7. Pierce v. Ortho, 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
[Vol. 10
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"[A]n employee should not have the right to prevent his or her em-
ployer from pursuing its business because the employee perceives that a
particular business decision violates the employee's personal morals as
distinguished from the recognized code of ethics of the employee's pro-
fession."" The Court stated that Dr. Pierce made her objections to
loperamide before Ortho asked the FDA for approval of the formula,
and, therefore there was no imminent risk to human beings. If the
FDA had disapproved it and Ortho had then required Dr. Pierce to go
ahead with human testing, the situation would have been different.
Further, saccharin was not harmful, merely controversial. It was not as
if Dr. Pierce was resisting the inclusion of cyanide in a drug to be given
to babies. There was merely "a difference in medical opinions," in
which Dr. Pierce found herself on the other side of the fence from her
co-workers and superiors. According to the court, Dr. Pierce was, in
effect, trying to force her employer to drop research on loperamide be-
cause she believed it was unsafe.
Justice Pashman, in dissent, listed various codes of medical ethics
which forbade doctors from conducting drug tests on humans "where
unnecessary medical risks have economic profit as their only justifica-
tion." 10 He pointed out that Dr. Pierce did not claim she had the right
to put an end to the loperamide project; she only claimed the right to
her professional autonomy. She merely expected to be able to express
her opinions on the use of saccharin in the drug without suffering the
loss of her job. Therefore, the majority's worry over granting doctors
"complete veto power over desirable drug development [was] ill-
conceived.""
Justice Pashman stated the majority also turned a blind eye to the
FDA's history of failing to monitor dangerous drugs. This very history
made it all the more important for professionals to act on their ethical
beliefs. The dissent believed that Dr. Pierce's reactions were timely,
8. Id. at 513.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 515-17. They were: The Declaration of Helsinki of the World Medical
Association, the guidelines of the American Medical Association, and the "Nurenburg
Code," as well as the Hippocratic Oath, which had been specifically mentioned by Dr.
Pierce. Judge Pashman chided the majority for rejecting as irrelevant the general lan-
guage of the Hippocratic Oath, as if that were the only source of ethics Dr. Pierce had
relied upon. She did speak of standards, plural and if the majority faulted her for
failing to be more specific, it was dismissing a claim merely because of a formal defect
in the pleadings.
11. Id. at 519.
1985]
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and that the danger she wished to avoid was imminent enough at the
time she voiced her protest. Justice Pashman asked, "[w]ould the ma-
jority have Dr. Pierce wait until the first infant was placed before her,
ready to receive the first dose of a drug containing forty-four times the
concentration of saccharin permitted in twelve ounces of soda?"' 2
Pierce v. Ortho is still good law in New Jersey. 13 At present, most
jurisdictions would deny a cause of action for wrongful discharge to
professionals who, because they have taken a stand based on their ethi-
cal codes, now find themselves at odds with their employers, and then
without a job at all. It is the thesis of this article that the professional
whistleblower in private employment should be protected by the com-
mon law from retaliatory firing. This article first examines the develop-
ment of employment-at-will and its counterdevelopments in statutes
and contract and tort law. It focuses on the so-called public policy ex-
ception to employment-at-will, which some courts use to grant relief for
these whistleblowers in case of wrongful discharge. Finally, this article
describes the ways in which a professional employee's response to her
ethical code is connected to public policy arguments as seen by: 1) the
ethical codes themselves, and their importance to the professions and
society as a whole; 2) the duty of the professional to consider the long-
range consequences of decisionmaking in connection with long-range
loyalty to an employer; and 3) the enormous and relatively unchecked
power of large private employers to affect the quality of life in our
society.
Professional whistleblowers are uniquely situated. Although myr-
iad government regulations do exist, these employees play essential
roles as buffers between private industry and the consuming public, es-
pecially when the former's focus on profits often clouds its judgment
regarding the health and safety of the latter. In order to be effective as
buffers, professionals who blow the whistle should be granted a cause of
action for wrongful discharge, not only when their employer's actions
violate a law or regulation, but also when these actions violate public
12. Id.
13. See 199 N.J. Super. 18, 488 A.2d 229 (1985), where a nurse would not ad-
minister kidney dialysis to a terminally-ill double amputee, because, on previous occa-
sions when she had performed the dialysis, the patient suffered severe internal hemor-
raging and cardiac arrest. She told her superiors that she had moral and philosophical
objections to repeating the procedure, as expressed in the Code for Nurses, and asked
to be reassigned. The nurse was again asked to dialyze the patient, however, and she
refused and was fired. Citing Pierce, the New Jersey Superior Court found that there
was no violation of public policy, and summary judgment was granted the defendant.
[Vol. 10
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policy as reflected by professional codes of ethics.
II. Historical Background
Employment-at-will is a relatively recent doctrine. It was adopted
more out of response to a rapidly industrializing economy than out of
feudal tradition. Due to the shortage of labor caused by the Black
Death, the Statute of Laborers1 4 was enacted in England in the mid-
Fourteenth century. This law provided that a servant hired for an un-
stated time period was presumed to be hired for one year. Even after
the statute was repealed, English courts still construed employment
contracts of unstated duration as contracts for one year.15 This inter-
pretation was followed by American courts until the 1880's. During the
industrial revolution, however, pressure built to allow more flexibility in
hiring and firing. Laissez-faire and freedom-to-contract were the fa-
vored economic ideologies, and a new rule regarding employment was
needed. In 1877, Horace Woods first enunciated this new rule.
"Wood's Rule," as it was to be known, stated that a hiring for an un-
specified period was a hiring at will, terminable by either party."6
The new principle of Woods Rule was given constitutional dimen-
sion during the Lochner era,' 7 when the Supreme Court struck down
laws aimed at controlling employment conditions as violations of sub-
stantive due process. In Adair v. United'States,'8 for instance, an em-
ployee of a railroad was fired for belonging to a labor union. Federal
legislation which would make this discharge a crime was held a depri-
vation of property and of personal liberty without due process. The
Court described the situation as if it were equally in the interests of
both parties to be free to contract for employment without interference
from the state. It stated, "[t]he right of an employee to quit the service
of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the
employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such
14. 31 Edw. III, ch. 7, repealed by S.L.R. 1863.
15. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LE-
GAL HIsT. 118, 119-20 (1976).
16. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272
(1877).
17. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) was the leading case. In Lochner,
a state law setting maximum hours for labor in bakeries was struck down as a depriva-
tion of liberty without due process.
18. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
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employee."19
In Coppage v. Kansas,2" similar state legislation was invalidated
on fourteenth amendment grounds. Coppage reflects a complete accept-
ance of freedom to contract, together with an acknowledgement of the
unequal basis upon which the employer and the employee face each
other. The Court wrote:
Since it is self evident that, unless all things are held in common,
some persons must have more property than others, it is from the
nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the
right of private property without at the same time recognizing as
legitimate inequities of fortune that are the necessary result of the
exercise of those rights.2 '
Twenty-two years later, the Supreme Court announced the first
limitations on employment at will in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.22 The Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act, explicitly
approving the Act's protection of the right of employees to organize
and form unions. The Court said, "[t] he Act does not interfere with the
normal exercise of the right ... to discharge. The employer may not,
under cover of that right, intimidate or coerce its employees with re-
spect to their self organization."2 3
A large segment (29.9%) of the American workforce is union-
ized,24 and their collective bargaining agreements provide that these
employees may not be fired except for just cause. The proportion of
workers protected by these provisions is dwindling, however. 25 Further,
as the worker's collar gets lighter, he or she is less and less likely to be
a member of a union.26 The concept of organizing and confronting the
employer as a group is virtually anathema to the professional employee,
whose image has traditionally been one of dignified personal auton-
19. Id. at 174-75.
20. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
21. Id. at 17.
22. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
23. Id. at 45-46.
24. A. SLOANE AND F. WHITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS 4 (1985).
25. Id. 20.9% of the workforce was unionized in 1984, down from 24.7% in
1970.
26. Id. at 6-7. The following list was based on figures provided by the U.S. De-
partment of Labor:
[Vol. 10
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omy.27 Unionization, then, is not likely to be a major limitation on the
discharge of professional workers.
A. Statutory Developments
Since the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,28 federal and
state29 legislatures passed a number of statutes establishing civil reme-
dies against employers who discharge employees because of their
race,30 sex,3 1 age, 2 or physical handicap.33 In addition, there is
Industry Percentage Unionized
Railroads 78.6
Automobiles 66.2
Primary metals 59.8
Postal 52.2
Paper 48.7
Other transportation 42.9
Telephone communication 40.1
Stone, clay and glass 39.6
Construction 39.2
Fabricated metals 38.2
Local government 19.6
State government 13.3
Wholesale, retail trade 10.2
Hospitals 8.4
Services, finance 7.8
The disparity will continue to have a great effect on overall union membership,
since fewer and fewer American workers are employed in heavy industry, while the
number of jobs in the white collar sector is on the rise.
27. Id. Professionals in unions include teachers (National Education Association
and the American Federation of Teachers), college instructors (125,000 belong to the
American Association of University Professors), and, to some extent, physicians
(16,000), engineers (50,000), and lawyers (several thousand). But most of the profes-
sionals represented by unions work for the government or for large institutions. Those
in the private sector are still vulnerable to employment-at-will. See also Note, A Rem-
edy for the Discharge of Professional Employees Who Refuse to Perform Unethical or
Illegal Acts: A Proposal in Aid of Professional Ethics, 28 VAND. L. REV. 805, 19-20
(1975).
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
29. Anti-discrimination statutes have been passed in 49 states.
30. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a (1976).
31. Id.
32. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. §
623(a) (1976).
33. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
1985]
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"whistleblower's" legislation on state and federal levels, protecting em-
ployees against dismissal for reporting violations of, for example, the
Clean Air Act, 4 ERISA, 35 OSHA,38 or the ERA.37 But a recent fifth
circuit decision 8 raises serious questions as to the effectiveness of such
legislation for those who voice their concerns to their superiors instead
of to the external enforcement agency. In Brown & Root, Inc., defen-
dant contractor at a nuclear power plant in Texas allegedly fired a
quality control inspector for reporting flawed welds to his corporate
superiors. The plaintiff employee claimed that his reports were pro-
tected activity under the federal law preventing retaliation against an
employee whistleblowing to enforce NRC regulations. 9 The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, reversing the administrative law judge, found
that the statute covered only whistleblowers who actually file their
complaints with the NRC, not those who merely reported to their em-
ployers.4 Although there is a split in the circuits on this issue,4' the
Department of Labor has chosen not to appeal the Fifth Circuit's rul-
ing to the Supreme Court. Such a narrow interpretation of the statu-
tory protection laid out by Congress bodes ill for professionals. The
more discreet, intracorporate form of blowing the whistle might often
be preferred by the professional, whose complaints are more likely to
affect employer practice than those of the ordinary worker. Further-
more, the relative power of professionals might deter them from going
straight to the regulatory authority, since, more than ordinary workers,
they can be expected to identify with their employers' public image and
long-range concerns. Perhaps this explains why, almost without excep-
tion, when professional whistleblowers attempt to sue for the tort of
wrongful discharge, their complaints were expressed only to their
superiors, not to the appropriate government agency, nor the media."2
34. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 312(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a)
(Supp. V 1981).
35. See Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 510, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1140 (1976).
36. See Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, § 11(c), 29 U.S.C. §
660(c) (1976).
37. See Energy Reorganization Act § 210(a), 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(3)(1976).
38. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1984).
39. Id. at 1029-31.
40. Id. at 1036.
41. Mackowiak v. University, 735 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1984).
42. Dr. Pierce vis-a-vis Ortho. See also Percival v. General Motors, 539 F.2d
1129 (8th Cir. 1976) (misrepresentations made to government, reported by engineer to
[Vol. 10
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Further statutory encroachments on employment-at-will include
state laws designed to prevent employers from intimidating their em-
ployees in certain ways. 43 For example, such a law might make it ille-
gal for an employer to threaten to fire any employee who will not vote
as ordered. 44 In Missouri, where such a statute existed, a worker was
fired because he refused to vote for a certain judge.4 5 But when he
brought a civil action against his boss, he lost because the law was a
criminal sanction, and made no mention of a civil action for damages
for the employee. 46 Other examples of statutory inroads upon employ-
ment-at-will are the civil service rules which protect federal, state and
local government employees against arbitrary dismissal.47
superiors); Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 111 111. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588
(1982) (embezzlement of corporate funds reported by head accountant to chief execu-
tive officers); Suchodolski v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316
N.W.2d 710 (1982) (senior auditor reported questionable internal systems to superi-
ors); Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86
(1983) (accounting improprieties and illegalities reported by assistant treasurer to top
management). But see, Rozier v. St. Mary's Hosp., 88 Ill. App. 3d 994, 411 N.E.2d 50
(1980) (indicating a willingness to go public). In Rozier, a nurse leaked damaging
information to the press, but only after her superiors ignored her complaints as to im-
proper treatment of patients.
43. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1101-02 (West 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
210A.14 (West Supp. 1981); Mo. REv. STAT. § 115.637.7 (Vernon 1966); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 12.07 (West Supp. 1984) (making it a crime for an employer to retaliate
against an employee for political activities); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-203 (West
1971); CAL. LABOR CODE § 450 (West 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.03 (1977) (mak-
ing it a crime for an employer to force an employee to, or prevent them from, patroniz-
ing particular businesses); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-15 (Burns 1974); MIcH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 418.125 (West 1970); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c § 1 (Vernon
1971) (making it a crime for an employer to fire an employee for filing a worker's
compensation claim; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31.379 (West 1975); MIcH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 15.362 (West 1981) (making it a crime for an employer to fire an employee for
reporting violations of state employee safety codes). For a detailed list of such statutes,
see 4 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1:35-:52 (1985).
44. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-1012 (West 1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 56, § 33 (West 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 12.09 (West Supp. 1984).
45. Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934).
46. Id. at 614. But see, Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 2d
481, 486, 171 P.2d 21, 25 (1946), where the statute included provision for a civil
remedy.
47. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970) (defining conditions for discharge of fed-
eral civil service employees); 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (1981 Supp.) (no disciplinary ac-
tion can be taken against certain federal employees for disclosure of nonprivileged in-
formation reasonably believed to evidence a violation of law, mismanagement of public
funds, or substantial and specific danger to public health or safety); or, on the state
1985]
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In spite of these existing protections, there are still millions of
American workers who, because they do not have a contract for a
stated duration, could be summarily fired and have no redress. Thus,
the existence of employment-at-will carries a tremendous potential im-
pact in our society, in which it is far easier for an employer to replace
an employee than for an employee to find a new job. The employment-
at-will doctrine has been criticized by a number of scholars.' 8 Professor
Lawrence E. Blades, in a seminal article of this ilk, describes it as a
severe threat to individual freedom. He says:
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon
others for our means of livelihood, and most of our people have
become completely dependent upon wages. If they lose their jobs,
they lose every resource ... [.] [S]uch dependence of the mass of
the people upon others for all of their income is something new in
the world. For our generation the substance of life is in another
man's hands.49
B. Contract Law Developments
In many states, courts have set limits on an employer's right to
terminate at-will employees by using contract law. There are two main
approaches: 1) to find a covenant of "good faith and fair dealing" im-
level, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50.5-103 and 105 (1980 Supp.) (state government em-
ployee's disclosure of public interest information cannot be disciplined). For a list of
statutes protecting whistleblowers at state level, see, 4 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 1:52
(1985).
48. See, e.g., Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Summers,
Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV.
481 (1976); Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983); Note, A Common Law Ac-
tion for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (1975); Note, A
Remedy for the Discharge of Professional Employees Who Refuse to Perform Unethi-
cal or Illegal Acts: A Proposal In Aid of Professional Ethics, 28 VAND. L. REv. 805
(1975); Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee Who 'Blows the
Whistle': A Cause of Action Based on Determinants of Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L.
REV.; Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and
Obedience: A Preliminary Inquiry, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 279 (1971).
49. See Blades, supra note 48, at 1404, quoting F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY
OF LABOR 9 (1951).
[Vol. 10
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plicit in the contract of employment, 50 or 2) to imply a contractual
term from an employer's handbook, policy statements, or behavior.5 1
The first method of ameliorating the employment-at-will doctrine
through contract principles is actually a contract-tort hybrid. Courts in
some states have imposed a duty of good faith and fair dealing upon
the parties. Under this theory, an employee may collect damages if he
can show that his dismissal was motivated by bad faith or malice. The
theory draws from tort law in that the duty imposed comes from public
policy concerns rather than an express or implied promise made by the
employer. However, it is generally described as sounding in contract,
and damages have been limited accordingly.
Courts in only seven states52 hold employers to the good faith and
fair dealing standard and they have been doing that gingerly. For in-
stance, New Hampshire, the first state to use the good faith rule,53 has
narrowed the rule's applicability to situations where employees are dis-
charged because they performed acts that public policy would en-
courage, or refused to do that which public policy would condemn. 4 In
a Massachusetts case, 55 the absence of good cause for discharge was
held not to be the equivalent of an absence of good faith. Good faith
was only one factor in determining fair dealing. In another Massachu-
setts case, Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,56 a salesman
claimed that his employer fired him after twenty-five years of service in
50. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
51. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722 (1980) (examination of written personnel policy and duration of employment);
Greene v. Howard University, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (employee told he is
"indispensable"); Fulton v. Tennessee Walking Horse Breeders' Ass'n., 63 Tenn. App.
569, 476 S.W.2d 644 (1971) (resolution of congratulations passed at annual meeting of
directors); Zimmer v. Wells Management Corp., 438 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(granting of additional authority, promotion, and permission to participate in stock
transaction); Maloney v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 352 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (custom of the industry).
52. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Montana and New
Hampshire.
53. See Monge, supra note 50, where a female employee was fired for refusing
the sexual advances of her supervisor. This case pre-dates the development of sexual
harassment theory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
54. Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 297, 414 A.2d 1273, 1274
(1980); Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d
1140 (1981).
55. Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981).
56. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
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order to avoid paying him commissions. He was discharged one day
after a customer placed a five-million dollar order with him. In general,
Massachusetts expects an employee to demonstrate that a dismissal
would financially benefit the employer at the employee's expense before
it questions an absence of bad faith.57
The second application of contract principles is only slightly more
popular. Fourteen states are willing to imply additional terms; usually,
that the employer will only fire the employee for "just cause."58 In this
theory's leading case, Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Michigan,59 Mr. Toussaint was handed a personnel manual at his hir-
ing which included a "just cause" policy statement. Also, in response to
his questions about job-security, he was told that if he was "doing his
job" he would not be discharged. 60 The court found that such state-
ments, written or oral, could amount to enforceable contractual
promises.61 Although an employer need not make such promises, once
they are made, the employer enhances the employment relationship,
"secur[ing] an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force."862 The court
also noted that terms could be implied although the policy manual that
gave rise to them was never signed, contained no specific reference to
the employee nor to his position, and could be changed unilaterally by
the employer without notice to the employee. Further, the court stated
it would not matter that the employee might not even realize that such
a manual existed until after he or she was hired.63 Another case in
which a "just cause" provision could be implied from a personnel hand-
book and verbal assurances at hiring was Weiner v. McGraw-Hill,
Inc.6 4 The court explained that consideration for such a promise could
be found in an employee's detrimental reliance on it. Mr. Weiner had
been lured away from another publisher with the promise, had seen it
incorporated in the employment application, had stayed on with Mc-
Graw-Hill, turning down job offers because of it, and had actually had
to use the "just cause" procedures himself in dismissing certain of his
57. See Siles v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 13 Mass. App. 354, 433 N.E.2d 103
(1982).
58. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota.
59. 408 Mich. 579, 592 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
60. Id. at 884.
61. Id. at 890.
62. Id. at 892.
63. Id.
64. 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
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own subordinates at McGraw. 5
Even where there was no booklet or manual, employees have been
able to argue the existence of an implied promise to discharge for just
cause. In Pugh v. See's Candles, Inc.,6 Mr. Pugh worked his way up
from dishwasher to vice president in thirty-two years of employment.
Right after a trip to Europe which he took with the president of See's
and their respective families, he was summarily fired. When he asked
why, the president told him that he should "look deep within
[him]self" to find the answer, that "things were said by people in the
trade that have come back to us." Up until this point, Pugh was consid-
ered an exemplary employee, honored by the company for his part in
making the previous year the most successful in See's history.67 The
court held that the jury could find an implied promise not to behave
arbitrarily toward employees, pointing to the length of his employment,
the promotions and commendations he had received, See's policy of not
firing administrative personnel without just cause, and assurances that
Pugh had been given during his early years with the company that "if
[he was] loyal to See's and [did] a good job, [his] future [would be]
secure."68 The above examples reflect a minority development, how-
ever. 9 Most courts would find that there was no consideration for any
implied promise to employ permanently, for instance. In exchange for
his or her labor, the employee collects a wage. Nothing extra is bar-
gained for on either side. 0
Some argue that, in the face df the majority's tendency to adhere
rigidly to traditional contract principles, an employee must negotiate
more favorable terms at the outset. But this is an unrealistic expecta-
tion. Employees generally are not in a position to bargain effectively for
job security. Only uniquely valuable employees would have such clout.
Even among professionals, a group perhaps most likely to behave with
a degree of educated assertiveness, the norm is to accept a job rather
informally, often verbally. Not much in the way of terms of employ-
ment is specified, usually nothing regarding its duration.7 1 Even where
65. Id. at 445.
66. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
67. Id. at 316-19.
68. Id. at 317, 329.
69. See, e.g., Beidler v. W.R. Grace, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
70. See Note, Employment Contracts of Unspecified Duration, 42 COLUM. L.
REv. 107, 121 (1942); Blades, supra note 48, at 1420.
71. See Note, A Remedy for the Discharge of Professional Employees, 28
VAND. L. REv. 805, 808, n.9 (1975).
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the minority rule of implied terms holds sway, employers can easily
circumvent the implied promise possibility by inserting express provi-
sions in a contract of employment insisting on their right to terminate
at will. Such provisions have been upheld in Michigan, where Tous-
saint was decided, for instance.7 2
C. Tort Law Developments
In response to this vulnerability, courts in recent years have been
willing to create a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge, where
an employee has been fired in circumstances which contradict sound
public policy. In one group of such cases, the employees were dismissed
for exercising a statutorily-given right. In Frampton v. Central Indiana
Gas Co.,7 3 for example, the plaintiff alleged that she had been fired in
retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim. Although the stat-
ute did not confer upon her a civil remedy, the court held that she had
a cause of action. If employees could be intimidated in this way, they
would not file claims, "opting, instead, to continue their employment
without incident. The end result, of course, is that the employer would
be effectively relieved of his obligation,' 74 and the public policy that
underlay the statute would be contravened. In Perks v. Firestone,5 the
employer was investigating complaints that some of its suppliers were
procuring prostitutes for employees. Plaintiff employee was told to take
a polygraph test. When he refused, he was fired. Since making employ-
ment contingent upon taking such a test was a misdemeanor in Penn-
sylvania, the court held that public policy was violated by the dismissal,
and reversed summary judgment for the defendant.7 6 These cases illus-
trate that, where an employee has been fired for exercising a right con-
72. See Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980);
Schipiani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
73. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
74. Id. at 427. Accord Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d
151 (1976); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 102 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979).
75. 611 F.2d 1363 (3rd Cir. 1979).
76. Id. at 1365. Not all jurisdictions have been that flexible with the public pol-
icy argument, using it to give teeth to employment-related statutes which are silent
regarding an employee's civil action for damages. For instance, in Kelly v. Mississippi
Valley Ga Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981), the court granted no cause of action
where an employee was fired for filing a worker's compensation claim. Also, the Ari-
zona Supreme Court held in Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907
(1977), that an employee's refusal to take a lie detector test did not entitle him to a
cause of action where the statute was merely a criminal sanction against the employer.
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ferred by statute, even in the absence of a corresponding personal rem-
edy, courts have been willing to grant a cause of action for wrongful
discharge. The public policy is easy to spot, since it is statutorily-man-
dated and in the context of employer-employee relations.
What should be the result when the employer has violated a law,
and the employee is fired for either refusing to go along with such be-
havior or making active efforts to end it? The statute involved in these
situations typically has no direct bearing on the employment relation-
ship and mentions neither an employee's right nor remedy. It is not
easy to generalize about the case law in this area, perhaps because pub-
lic policy, "the unruly horse of the law," can be many things to many
judges. One commentator has described the decisions as "ad hoc judg-
ment(s), uninformed by detailed examination of the merits of drawing
the line in one place rather than another . . . an unpredictable and
sometimes counterintuitive pattern of holdings . . .
The case law in this area is untidy. Amid the confusion, certain
trends can be identified. These trends support the thesis of this article;
that there is a clear public policy justification for granting a cause of
action for wrongful discharge to the professional whistleblower.
Some jurisdictions simply will not create a right of action on pub-
lic policy grounds. A New York plaintiff, an employee of 23 years, an
assistant treasurer, alleged that he was fired for announcing to top
management that he knew of illegal accounting practices involving at
least 50 million dollars. He told them that secret pension reserves had
improperly inflated the company's growth, allowing certain officers to
receive unwarranted bonuses via a management incentive plan.78 In an-
other case from New York, the plaintiff worked for Citibank and re-
ported illegal foreign currency manipulation to his superiors. 79 Neither
of these whistleblowers had a cause of action, since New York does not
recognize the tort of wrongful discharge as against public policy. Simi-
larly, in Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hospital8 0 plaintiff was fired for re-
fusing to falsify medical records. The Alabama Supreme Court, cling-
ing to the concept of the employer's right to terminate at will,
77. Note, Protecting Employees at Will, supra note 48, at 1949.
78. See Murphy, supra note 42, at 89-90.
79. Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270, affd
74 A.D. 2553 (1979).
80. 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977). Accord Gil v. Metal Service Corp., 412
So. 2d 706 (La. App. 1982); Goodroe v. Georgia Power Co., 148 Ga. App. 193, 251
S.E.2d 51 (1978).
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described public policy as "too nebulous a standard," and affirmed
summary judgment for the defendant.
Among the state courts recognizing the public-policy-based cause
of action for whistleblowers is California, where, in 1959, Petermann
v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters"' was decided. There, the plaintiff
was instructed by his employer to lie when testifying before a legisla-
tive investigatory committee. He refused and was fired. The court
found that he had a cause of action, and described public policy as
"that principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that
which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against public
good." ' When his boss made plaintiff's continued employment depend
upon his willingness to commit perjury, public policy was clearly vio-
lated. The effect "would be to encourage criminal conduct upon the
part of both the employee and the employer, and would serve to con-
taminate the honest administration of public affairs."8' 3
Petermann has been cited in a number of whistleblower cases that
have been heard in recent years.8 4 Where a plaintiff appears to be un-
fairly stuck between the 'rock' of job loss and the 'hard place' of partic-
ipation in an employer's illegal scam, some courts support an action for
wrongful discharge. For example, where an employer would expect an
employee to falsify pollution reports,8 5 or take part in illegal price fix-
ing,86 these courts view public policy as support for "good citizenship;"
in effect they forbid an employer from forcing an employee to commit
a crime. The various encroachments on employment-at-will are often
reviewed in these cases, producing such conclusions as "[t]he employer
is not so absolute a sovereign of the job that there are not limits to his
prerogative. One such limit is ... the employer cannot condition em-
81. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1969).
82. Id. at 27.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111, 1119 (E.D. Pa.
1979); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 836, 610 P.2d
1330 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385
(1980); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625, 630 (1982);
Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 85 11. 2d 124, 52 Ill. Dec. 13, 421 N.E. 2d 876, 879
(1981); Petrik, supra note 42, at 590-92; O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416,
390 A.3d 149 (1978); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270, 274
(W. Va. 1978).
85. Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265
N.W.2d 385 (1978).
86. Tameny, supra note 84.
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ployment upon required participation in unlawful conduct by the em-
ployee."8 7 At stake are the employee's interest in a clear conscience
(and a clean record), 88 and the public's interest in a well-functioning
criminal justice system.89 The professional whistleblower can certainly
point to this line of cases for a supportive definition of public policy. On
the other hand, courts have frequently been influenced by the policy
argument that employees must be loyal, and that whistleblowing is dis-
loyal, a form of biting the hand that feeds. Although it could also be
argued that protecting one's employer from the repercussions of illegal
procedures (treble damages in antitrust suits, or personal injury dam-
ages in product liability suits) is real, long-term loyalty, many judges
seem to favor the short-term variety.
It is interesting to examine the decisional law in the light of the
loyalty issue. If we assume that the fewer waves made by the
whistleblower the better, it would make sense for courts to be more
comfortable granting a cause of action for wrongful discharge to pas-
sive whistleblowers, those who merely refuse to cooperate in illegal be-
havior, or merely register internal complaints, than to the more active
variety of whistleblower, those who threaten to rock the corporate boat
more severely by going public with their complaints. The decisions do
not exhibit this logic. For instance, in 1980, a research technician
working for a pharmaceutical manufacturer reported violations of the
FDA's drug safety regulations to his supervisors. He was fired.90 The
Indiana Supreme Court refused to grant a cause of action for merely
doing what public policy encouraged, in light of the competing interest
of an employer to be able to determine whom to employ.9 1 Yet, in Illi-
nois in 1981, where the plaintiff reported crimes of fellow employees to
the police, a cause of action for retaliatory discharge was stated.
"There is no public policy more basic, nothing more implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty than the enforcement of a state's criminal
code." 92
87. Id. at 1136.
88. Harless, supra note 84, at 276; Sheets, supra note 84, at 388-89.
89. Petrik, supra note 42, at 590-92; Palmateer, supra note 85, at 879-80.
90. Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
91. Id. at 1058.
92. Palmateer, supra note 85, at 878-79. In this case, the employee had worked
for the defendant for sixteen years, and was a manager at the time he was fired. He
was not, however, a "professional." Note that Palmateer was discharged for cooperat-
ing in the criminal investigation of fellow employees. The process would go on with or
without his help. In this sense, although he became involved in a "public" exposure, he
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The case law also does not exhibit uniformity in terms of support-
ing law enforcement by supporting the whistleblower. A comparison
between two cases from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, both in-
volving the reporting of antitrust violations, provides an example of this
sheer inconsistency. In a 1979 decision, the plaintiff refused to partici-
pate in his employer's anti-competitive violations where, for instance,
Food Fair, but not Acme, was given price breaks."3 He claimed he was
fired for refusing to commit a crime. The court held he had a cause of
action for wrongful discharge.94 However, in another case, a dismissal
was granted against another sales manager in 1982, where he objected
to identical illegal discounting and was fired. 3
There is, however, a recognizable trend in the morass of public
policy decisions; that is, to protect whistleblowers who are considered
under an obligation to report wrongdoing. For example, Indiana's Su-
preme Court, in the Campbell case, denied a cause of action to the
mere research technician who reported misconduct in the gathering of
drug safety data for the FDA.96 But a federal court interpreting Indi-
ana law found for a Mr. Perry, who had been fired for refusing to con-
tinue his participation in violations of antitrust law and for delivering
evidence of these violations to his employer.9 Distinguishing Campbell,
the court stated that Mr. Perry was "under a statutory duty to refrain
from engaging in conspiracies in restraint of trade."98
In some cases, the employee's job responsibilities include the re-
sponsibility to report and these whistleblowers are given more protec-
tion. For example, in Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc.," a quality
control director for a frozen food company told his supervisors that cer-
tain meats and vegetables were substandard according to Connecticut
law. Dismissal of his claim was reversed. 100 In Harless v. First Na-
tional Bank in Fairmont,'0' another dismissal was reversed where the
manager of a consumer credit department of a bank reported illegal
overcharging practices on prepayment of installment loans. In Petrik v.
was not the initiator, and might therefore be classified as "passive."
93. McNulty, supra note 84.
94. Id. at 1119-20.
95. Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
96. Campbell, supra note 90, at 1057.
97. Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387, 1388 (S. D. Ind. 1982).
98. Id. at 1389. But see, dissent in Campbell, supra note 90, at 1063.
99. Supra note 84.
100. Id. at 388.
101. Supra note 84.
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Monarch Printing Corp.,102 a vice president of finance reported his sus-
picions of embezzlement of corporate funds. He too stated a claim for
wrongful discharge. Perhaps the tendency to protect this type of
whistleblower exists because, if they fail to object and allow the wrong-
doing to continue, they are, in effect, promoting it in a more active
sense than could a less powerful employee. In any case, these decisions
seem to define public policy as follows: the more job responsibilities
carried by the whistleblower, the greater should be his or her freedom
to raise issues, such as those mentioned above, without risking retalia-
tory firing. This trend is obviously relevant to the dissenting profes-
sional employee.
Consistency is a chimera, however, even as to whistleblowers with
considerable power and responsibility. A federal court in Michigan, for
instance, granted summary judgment for the employer. In Percival v.
General Motors,1 03 plaintiff was a mechanical engineer and an execu-
tive who worked for GM for 25 years. He claimed that he was fired for
his complaint about GM's deceptive practices, his refusal to give the
federal government false information, and his attempts to correct cer-
tain misrepresentations made to the government. Here, plaintiff's status
gave even more weight to the defendant's interests. "A large corporate
employer such as GM ... must be accorded wide latitude in determin-
ing whom it will employ in high and sensitive management positions,
particularly where developments in the field of mechanical engineering
are involved." 1°4
At the losing end of the spectrum are employees who take it upon
themselves to object to an employer's practices which, though not nec-
essarily illegal, may be, in the employee's opinion, dangerous. Mr.
Geary, for example, worked as a salesman of tubular products to the oil
and gas industry, and believed that a certain new product was not ade-
quately tested and, therefore, unsafe. When he told this to his superi-
ors, he was ordered to follow directions and continue selling. Instead,
he went to the vice president with his concerns. The product was even-
tually re-evaluated and withdrawn. In a sense, so was Mr. Geary; he
was fired. 105 Pennsylvania's Supreme Court ruled against him, stating,
"no public policy is violated when a company discharges an employee
who is not qualified to make technical judgments for making a nui-
102. Supra note 42.
103. 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976).
104. Id. at 1130.
105. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
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sance of himself." 0 The court mentioned the employer's legitimate in-
terest in hiring and retaining the best personnel available. The best per-
sonnel, it seemed to say, would be those who understood that employees
should not go over the heads of their immediate supervisors. By doing
just that, Mr. Geary displayed an inability to work effectively with fel-
low employees. An employer should have the right to discharge an em-
ployee for such a reason without worrying about being sued. These too,
stated the court, are public policy concerns."0 7
III. The Professional Whistleblower
In this area of law, there is a special case; that of the professional
employee who feels compelled to blow the whistle in response to the
dictates of a professional ethical code. In such situations, an employer
may not necessarily be violating any law, nor expecting the employee to
participate in doing so. Where this is true, they resemble the Geary
type of whistleblower cases in which the employee may be viewed as a
meddling, inappropriate watchdog, who deserves to be fired. But, they
also strongly resemble the cases in which employees are allowed a
cause of action because their job responsibilities may require them to
be aware of, and responsive to, certain problems. In addition, the pro-
fessional whistleblower situation involves a new factor; that is, the ar-
gument that professional codes of ethics are, in part, designed to be in
the public interest, and, therefore, it may well be an overriding public
policy to encourage the professional to behave in accordance with such
a code.
A. Ethics and Loyalty
The employer does have a legitimate interest in maintaining an
efficient and loyal workforce. Even workers who are protected under
section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act from being discharged
for union organizing are not so protected for activities which are seen
as "disruptive" or "insubordinate". "There is no more elemental cause
for discharge of an employee than disloyalty to his employer." 108
106. Id. at 178-79.
107. Id. at 179.
108. NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l. Bd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 472
(1953). For a recent development, see Pacemaket Yacht Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 455,
462-63 (3rd Cir. 1981) (Garth, J., concurring).
[Vol. 10
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss1/2
Protecting the Professional Whistleblower
The professional employee, however, owes other loyalties; to the
profession itself, and to the public at large. Ethical codes are the offi-
cial guidelines by which a profession hopes to maintain both actual in-
ternal quality and the public's perception of that quality. They may be
self-serving, but they also serve society as a whole by attempting to
ensure that the power which professionals hold is intelligently and mor-
ally exercised. These codes insist that the professional, above all, re-
spond to that which is best for the public in general. According to the
ethical code of the National Society of Professional Engineers, for ex-
ample, engineers must "use knowledge . . . for the advancement of
human welfare," and where that brings them into conflict with their
employer, they must "regard [their] duty to the public welfare as para-
mount." 109 And, as a legal example, while lawyers are directed to "re-
present a client zealously, they may not counsel or assist a client in
conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent." 1 0 Further:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: (1) his
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to
rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he
shall promptly reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal,
except when the information is protected as privileged
communication."'
Professional ethics codes do not simply urge quality performance;
they clearly link performance with a public trust. These mixed loyalties
of professionals set them apart from ordinary whistleblowers. Profes-
sionals respond, not only to the promptings of good citizenship, but to
the promptings of their codes that direct them to speak out even if they
must step on some important toes by doing so. If ordinary
whistleblowers should not be forced to choose between losing a job and
committing a crime, professionals surely deserve even more protection;
for they are not only pressured to break the law, but also to go against
109. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-1 (1974).
110. Id., DR 7-102
111. Id., DR 7-102. The attorney-client privilege is expressed in Canon 4, but it
extends only to past crimes, not to current or continuing crimes. Hinds v. State Bar, 19
Cal. 2d 87, 92-93, 119 P.2d 134, 137 (1941). Recently, however, the ABA voted to
define "crimes" as crimes of violence. So-called "economic atrocities," such as securi-
ties fraud, which an attorney may know are in the planning stage, do not have to be
reported.
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professional ethical guidelines.
The whole question of loyalty to the employer is further compli-
cated by the fact that a professional employee is frequently in a posi-
tion to envision both the short-term and the long-term consequences of
a course of action. At times, while short-term consequences seem to
work, long-term consequences are worrisome. It is often this sort of
realization that inspires a professional to blow the whistle. And it is
certainly arguable that the employer's interests were best served by
such behavior. For example, in Edwards v. Citibank,112 Mr. Edwards
went to his immediate supervisors, and then to the bank's senior vice
president for foreign exchange, about a practice called "parking." This
involved the bogus transfer of foreign exchange positions to shift profits
to tax havens, like the Bahamas. Edwards was concerned that this was
"just bad business . . . [W]e risk being tossed out on our rear-ends
from some of these countries." 1 3 Similarly, a senior design engineer for
Ford, Frank Camps, believed that the Pinto safety testing program was
inadequate and even illegal. Ford was in a hurry to get federal certifi-
cation for the Pinto, and it had to be cheap enough and light enough to
compete with the VW and Japanese imports. To comply with federal
windshield retention standards, Ford engineers designed the Pinto so
that the energy produced by crash impact would be directed away from
the front of the car towards the gas tank. Mr. Camp's concern, which,
unfortunately, proved to be well-founded, was that his employer's repu-
tation and financial stability would be seriously undermined if it had to
defend this sort of design ploy in personal injury lawsuits. He began
writing letters to management, feeling that he "faced the dilemma of
either serving the best interest of the Ford Motor Company or submit-
ting to the directives of [his] immediate supervisors."14
So, real loyalty to an employer, especially for the professional em-
ployee, may mean taking the long view. Many employers understand
this and provide internal mechanisms for airing complaints and sugges-
tions, no matter how unpopular these might be." 5 A cause of action for
112. 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269, ajfd 74 A.D. 2553 (1979).
113. Rowan, The Maverick Who Yelled Foul at Citibank, FORTUNE, January
10, 1983, at 49.
114. See Whistleblowing, supra note 1, at 123.
115. For an analysis of the benefits of dissent, and descriptions of how company
policy can make the most effective use of it, see A. URIs, EXECUTIVE DISSENT, 9-14 &
162-79 (1978); Whistleblowing, supra note 1, at 141-51. See also F. FOULKES, PER-
SONNEL POLICIES IN LARGE NONUNION COMPANIES (1980); Rowe and Baker, Are You
Hearing Enough Employee Concerns?, 62 HARV. Bus. REV. 127-35, May-June 1984.
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the wrongfully-dismissed whistleblower then, arguably, could reflect the
employer's interest in loyalty, newly defined as a high-quality, thinking
workforce. As the chief executive officer of the Greyhound Corporation
puts it, "I want spirited managers who will challenge the system ... I
don't warm lukewarm employees. They breed mediocrity and a womb-
to-tomb attitude." ' 6
Another argument for special treatment of the professional
whistleblower is that they are licensed and regulated by the state, sub-
ject to disciplinary actions, both for violations of their own codes or of
external regulations. This fact further illustrates the way in which pro-
fessional employment is intertwined with the public interest. In 1982, a
New Jersey pharmacist was in charge of the defendant employer's
drugstore, which was located inside defendant's grocery store. The
plaintiff's superior told him that on the 4th of July the grocery would
be open, but the pharmacy would be closed. The plaintiff believed that
state regulations required the pharmacy to be open when the store itself
was open. Therefore, acting on his belief, he went to work on July 4th
and was fired. In reversing summary judgment for the pharmacist, the
court saw a public policy issue reflected in the twin elements of state
law and a professional code of ethics.11 7 Mr. Kalman, the plaintiff here,
was not just concerned in case drugs were stolen or wrongly dispensed.
He was also worried that his license might be revoked. L8
Professional whistleblowers are often in a position to be jeopard-
ized, as their employers would be, by repercussions as serious as loss of
employment. In this sense, tob, they are set apart from the ordinary
worker who responds out of concerns of conscience. For example, a su-
perior court in California recently awarded $250,000 to an insurance
company's staff attorney who alleged that he was fired for refusing to
go along with their order that he "not ... disclose to [insureds] offers
to settle within the policy limits." According to the plaintiff, state ethi-
cal rules demanded that he convey such news to policyholders." 9 Law-
yers can be disbarred for unethical handling of a settlement, for set-
Blind loyalty to a corporation has recently been viewed as a liability in some ways; that
is, where it has produced stodgy, plodding, unimaginative management. See McDowell,
Job Loyalty: Not the Virtue It Seems, NEW YORK TIMES, March 3, 1985, at F, ol. 1.
116. McDowell, supra note 115 (quoting J. Teets).
117. Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728, 730
(1982).
118. Id. at 729.
119. Galante, In-House Attorney Wins $250,000 for Wrongful Discharge, NA-
TIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Fall 1984.
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tling a case without a client's permission, or for not telling them about
an offer to settle."' 0 The Ford engineer began a barrage of letters com-
plaining about the Pinto tests, not just out of concern for his employer,
but also because he did not want to be made a scapegoat. He said:
At about this time, the concept that negligence in design as a basis
for liability was taking hold in legal circles, and I was fearful of
the consequences. Therefore, I wrote to management in order to
allay my fears that at some future date I would be held personally
liable for a Pinto fatality.' 21
It has been demonstrated that, if there is any recognizable trend in
the case law dealing with the public-policy exception to employment-at-
will and whistleblowers, it lies in allowing a cause of action where the
whistleblowers' jobs make them responsible for reporting miscon-
duct.122 Engineers, architects, lawyers, accountants, doctors and other
professionals are very often highly-placed, charged with overseeing the
general quality of a project or a series of projects. Since, even more
than the ordinary employee who blows the whistle, these people are
expected to respond using independent judgment and foresight, it
makes particularly good sense to allow them to do so without risking
their jobs.
B. Public Policy and Private Power
That large corporations wield enormous power in American society
is a fact which has been noted and analyzed for decades. 2 The corpo-
120. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-7 (1974); In re
Ilse, 104 Wis. 2d 522, 312 N.W.2d 57 (1981); In re Dobbertin, 458 N.Y.S.2d 775
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983); In re Brown, 104 Ariz. 387, 453 P.2d 958 (1969).
121. Whistleblowing, supra note 1, at 123. See also SETHI, The Expanding
Scope of Executive Liability (Criminal and Civil) For Corporate Law Violations, in
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC PURPOSE 245-74 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Pri-
vate Enterprise].
122. See supra, notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., A. BERLE AND G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY (1932); R. BRADY, BUSINESS AS A SYSTEM OF POWER (1943); G. Mc-
CONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966); R. NADER AND M.
GREEN, CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA (1973) [hereinafter cited as Corporate
Power]; A. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE (1975); R. HARRISON, PLURAL-
ISM AND CORPORATISM (1980); Blumberg, supra note 48, at 299.
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rate giants have tremendous influence on our political system."l 4 Com-
mentators have viewed large corporations as governments themselves,
but governments with a difference, in that they are basically unac-
countable to their constituents, their shareholders. As one scholar put
it: "The official doctrine that the corporate directors are responsible to
the stockholders is so irrelevant as to be ridiculous. The directors are, if
reality is considered, effectively responsible to management, and man-
agement tends to be self-perpetuating."1 25 Whereas the power of gov-
ernment is constitutionally delimited by the system of checks and bal-
ances, by federalism, by the Bill of Rights, and by the electoral process,
the power of private industry is, in the opinion of many, unchecked and
unresponsive to either its shareholders or to the general public.1
26
There is no denying the increasing degree to which these "govern-
ments" make decisions that gravely affect their "citizens." The safety
of the cars we drive, the quality of the air we breathe - from rela-
tively small details to ultimate issues, the large corporations exercise
great power. Federal and state agencies do exist, and do issue regula-
tions. However, they rely for their data on the very private industry
that they aim to control. It is this reliance which makes the role of the
whistleblower, especially the professional whistleblower, so crucial.
When Ford sought federal certification of its Pinto, it expected Frank
Camp to cooperate in feeding the government manipulated safety-test
results.127 Grace Pierce knew that Ortho's recommendations to the
FDA concerning the loperamide formula would probably be accepted,
and although this situation did not involve falsified reports or any out-
right violation of a regulatory scheme, she perceived herself as the last
line of defense precisely because the FDA relies on data provided by
the pharmaceutical industry.1 28 This fact, and the relatively abyssmal
record of the agency was mentioned by the dissent in Pierce:
124. See Harris, The Politics of Corporate Power, in Corporate Power, supra
note 123; Swanson, Corporations and Electoral Activities: The Legal, Political and
Managerial Implications of PACs, in Private Enterprise, supra note 121, at 355-72.
125. See G.MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra
note 123, at 250, quoting A. BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLU-
TION 51 (1954).
126. Flynn, Corporate Democracy: Nice Work If You Can Get It, in Corporate
Power, supra note 123, at 99-100; Epstein, Societal, Managerial and Legal Perspec-
tives on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1287 (1979).
127. Whistleblowing, supra note 1, at 122.
128. Id. at 116.
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In apparent ignorance of the past failures of official regulation to
safeguard against pharmaceutical horrors, the majority implies
that the necessity for administrative approval for human testing
eliminates the need for active ethical professionals within the drug
industry. But we do not know whether the United States Food and
Drug Administration would be aware of the safer alternative to the
proposed drug when it would pass upon defendant's application for
the more hazardous formula. The majority professes no such
knowledge . . .This highlights the need for ethically autonomous
professionals within the pharmaceutical industry .... 1'9
Whistleblowing, then, is at present perhaps one of the most effec-
tive ways to encourage large corporations to attend to interests beyond
their own. It would seem important that the common law evolve in a
manner that preserves this mechanism. Instead, the doctrine of employ-
ment-at-will allows employers to retaliate freely against its watchdogs.
According to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Grace Pierce
was, in effect, claiming that she had a right to veto Ortho's develop-
ment of loperamide because, in her opinion, it was too risky. This
would never do: "[c]haos would result if a single doctor engaged in
research were allowed to determine, according to his or her individual
conscience, whether a project could continue." 130
The cases do not suggest that whistleblowers must be fired in order
to free their bosses to continue whatever practices were disturbing to
the complaining employee. Rather, the firings appear to be in retalia-
tion for disruptive disloyal behavior. Grace Pierce was removed from
therapeutic drug research, and eventually made to feel that she had to
leave Ortho. Meanwhile, the loperamide program went on with replace-
ment personnel. Eventually, however, the company decided not to mar-
ket the formula Dr. Pierce had protested. So, in that case, the objec-
tionable project continued while she was reassigned, and ended after
she was fired.13' In the Edwards case, "parking" continued unimpeded,
129. Pierce, supra note 7, at 519. On the ineffectiveness of state and federal
regulatory schemes to ensure compliance, and the need for whistleblowing, see, e.g., C.
STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 209-
14 (1975); BLOWING THE WHISTLE: DISSENT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST (T. Branch and
C. Peters eds. 1972).
130. Pierce, supra note 7, at 514.
131. Whistleblowing, supra note 1, at 116. In other cases, whistleblowers' sug-
gestions for improvements were followed, and then they were fired. For instance, in
Geary, supra note 105, the product complained about was withdrawn from production,
and then Mr. Geary was discharged. In Adams v. Budd Co., 583 F. Supp. 711 (E.D.
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before and after Mr. Edwards expressed his concern over it to his im-
mediate supervisors and then to Citibank's senior vice president for for-
eign exchange. And he was dismissed in a way that clearly indicated
how slight were the effects: "You drew your gun and you didn't shoot,"
said his boss, "now we're going to shoot you." 32
If whistleblowers were able to exercise ultimate control over their
employers' practices, surely they would not bother blowing the whistle
in the first place. It is far more plausible that they are fired, not be-
cause employers were forced to rid themselves of the offending employ-
ees before they could act as they saw fit, but as punishment for making
waves.
IV. Conclusion
Although private employers must be free to fire employees for a
variety of reasons, because of the above-mentioned characteristics dis-
tinguishing the professional employee from any other kind, they should
be protected by the common law for expressing concern over, not just a
present illegal activity, but a potentially illegal or unethical activity. It
is especially important to empower these employees to respond to be-
havior which is not, strictly speaking, illegal, in the light of the fact
that large private employers represent tremendous concentrations of
power, and in the light of the imperfect record of government agencies
to make drugs, cars, and nuclear power plants safe for the American
public. A cause of action based on the public policy exception to em-
ployment-at-will should be available to those whose professional code of
ethics has prompted them to blow the whistle.
Pa. 1984), a railcar was stripped as per Mr. Adams' suggestion, and then, he was fired
seven months later.
132. See FORTUNE, supra note 113, at 52.
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